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I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of the network services, it is important to authenticate the user's identity before allowing access to the servers' resource. Most of the existing authentication schemes are based on encryption strategies, so the communication and computation costs are relatively high, and the public keys directory should be maintained and protected. To use the network services provided by servers in mobile wireless network, password and hash function based authentication using smart card is one of the simplest and the most widely used strategies [1] . However, there are two weaknesses in hash-function-based schemes. The one is that the server should store verification tables to verify the validity of the users, but it will suffer from the stolen-verifier attack [2] . The other is, timestamps are used to avoid replay attacks, but it needs time synchronization [3] . Therefore, it is important to design hash function and random nonce based authentication protocols without verification tables.
Since Chang and Wu [4] introduced password authentication scheme with smart card, many smart card based password authentication schemes have been proposed. However, many of them are vulnerable to offline password guessing attack when attacker has ever obtained the information stored in smart card [5] . The reason is that user's password is a short string with low entropy, and smart card always stores secret information. Therefore, one of the major challenges of designing smart card based password authentication protocols is how to resist the off-line password guessing attacks.
On the other hand, if remote users want to use network services provided by multiple servers, they must register their identities and passwords at these servers and become the legal users. Obviously, it is not efficient. To meet this demand, Li et al. [6] , Lin et al. [7] , Tsaur et al. [8] [9] and Juang [10] proposed multi-server authentication schemes, respectively. In their schemes, any remote user only registers with the registration center once, and can obtain services from multiple servers without repeating registration to every single server. However, the communication and computation costs in these authentication schemes are relatively high, since these schemes used encryption strategies or neural networks. In 2006, Cao et al. [11] pointed out that Lin et al.'s scheme is insecure. In 2009, Liao et al. [12] proposed a dynamic ID scheme for multi-server environment. However, Hsiang et al. [13] found their scheme suffers from the insider attacks.
Recently, Tsai [14] proposed a hash-function-based multi-server authentication scheme using smart card and random nonce without verification tables, it is more efficient then before. However, Chen et al. [15] showed that Tsai's scheme cannot resist the server spoofing attack, and proposed a novel one. They claimed that the new protocol is not only the most secure but also the most efficient in a multi-server environment.
In this paper, we point out that Chen et al.'s protocol cannot resist off-line password guessing attacks. Moreover, we propose two improvements of Tsai's and Chen et al's protocols, respectively. Our protocols have many advantages over existing solutions, as it relies on neither of encryption, signature, verification tables, timestamp, and public keys directory. Compared to the first improved protocol, the second improvement has the merit that the user can access the server's resource without the help of the authentication center from the second time authentication.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section II, we propose an improvement of Tsai's protocol. Then, we briefly review and analyze Chen et al's protocol in Section III. After that, the proposed improvement of Chen et al's protocol is presented and analyzed in Sections IV. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section V.
II. IMPROVEMENT OF TSAI'S PROTOCOL
In this section, we propose the improvement of Tsai's protocol, and present the security analysis. The following notations are used throughout this paper:
p : a large prime number. 
A. The Improved Protocol
The improved protocol has s servers, n users and an authentication center ( AC for short). At the beginning, AC randomly chooses two secret numbers x and y, computes and sends ( || ) 
and generates two random nonce r and R ,computes
At last, AC sends 3 C , 4 C to u U , and sends 5 C , 6 C to the server j S .
RSU 3: 7 8 : ; : 
and sends it to u U and j S .
4. Mutual authentication and session key generation MA1: 10 11 : ; :
After receiving 9 C from AC , the server j S retrieves
and S is a random nonce, and sends 10 C to u U . Similarly, after receiving 9 C from AC , u U retrieves
generates a random nonce C , computes 2 mod
and sends it to j S .
MA2:
After receiving 10 C 2. Replay attack General speaking, the aim of using random nonce in authentication scheme is to withstand the replay attack. In our protocol, each authentication message includes fresh nonce when AC , the server and the user perform the mutual authentication protocol. Therefore, the proposed protocol can resist the replay attack if an attacker does not know ( || )
3. Impersonation attack In improved protocol, the registration center needs to authenticate the server and the user, and issue the one time authentication key to them before they perform the mutual authentication protocol. If attacker impersonates the legal user or the legal server, he will not be authenticated by the registration center without knowing the user u U 's secret number ( || ) 
Only the authenticated server can get N . Therefore, the session key is security. 5. Forward security In improved protocol, the session key is forward security. Since an attacker cannot obtain ( , , , , , ) c s C S r R even if he knows the user's password, all information of smart cart, and
N . Therefore, an attacker cannot compute SK .
6. Man-in-the-middle attack The messages of the server and the user send to the authentication center include
they contain identities of two communication entities. The adversary cannot pass through the authentication since he doesn't own the secret information x and y . So, the improved protocol can resist man-in-the-middle attack.
III. ATTACKS ON CHEN ET AL.'S PROTOCOL
Chen et al. claimed that their protocol can resist all attacks including off-line password guessing attack and smart-card-lost attack. However, we will show that their protocol is vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack.
A. Brief Review of Chen et al.'s Protocol
Chen et al.'s protocol consists of three phases: preparation phase, registration phase, authentication phase. The authentication phase can be divided into three scenarios: (1) the first time authentication and session key agreement phase; (2) not the first time authentication and session key agreement phase; (3) authentication and password change phase. 
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IV. IMPROVEMENT OF CHEN ET AL.'S PROTOCOL
To overcome the weaknesses of Chen et al.'s protocol, in this section, we will propose the improved protocol.
A. Improvement of Chen et al.'s Protocol
The improved protocol consists of three phases: preparation phase, registration phase, authentication phase. The preparation phase and registration phase are the same as those of Chen et al.'s protocol, authentication phase can also be divided into three scenarios: (1) the first time authentication and session key agreement phase; (2) not the first time authentication and session key agreement phase; (3) authentication and password change phase. The details are as follows.
(1) The first time authentication and session key agreement phase When u U wants to access any resource of the server j S , he inserts smart card into a terminal device, and performs the following steps:
Step 1:
, , Step2--Step5: The same as steps RSU1-RSU4 of improvement of Tsai's protocol in section II.
Step 6: The same as step MA1 of improvement of Tsai's protocol in section II.
Step7:
After receiving 10 C and 11 Step 3: N but attacker cannot, which include the random nonce c , and RC can return the authentication message which includes the Diffie-Hellman value cr g , so attacker cannot verify whether the authentication message from RC right or not. On the other hand, the attacker cannot generate the authentication message that can make pass through the authentication of RC .
Therefore, the proposed protocol can resist the replay attack.
3. Impersonation attack and forgery attack If a legal user v U wants to impersonate u U to access the server j S 's resource, however it is impossible. The reason is that v U cannot pass through the authentication of RC or j S without knowing the u U 's password.
Forward security
In improved protocol, the session key is forward security. Since an attacker cannot obtain all the random nonce even if he knows the user's password, all information of smart cart, and the nonce's discrete logarithm, so he cannot get the Diffie-Hellman values between the server and the user. Therefore, an attacker cannot compute SK .
5. Session key security In improved protocol, the session key is not known by anyone but the server and the user, since the session key which include the Diffie-Hellman values between the server and the user, and the protocol is forward security, so attacker cannot get the random nonce and the DiffieHellman values. Therefore, the session key is security. 6. Man-in-the-middle attack In improved protocol, all the authentication messages of the server and the user include identities of two communication entities. The adversary cannot pass through the authentication since he doesn't own the secret information x and y of RC , and the user and the server's password. So, the improved protocol can resist man-in-the-middle attack.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Nowadays, Tsai's and Chen et al.'s authentication protocols are the most efficient in a multi-server environment. However, their protocols are all insecure. In this paper, we presented off-line password guessing attacks on Chen et al.'s protocol, and proposed two improved protocols to overcome Tsai's and Chen et al.'s weaknesses, respectively. In the future work, it is very interesting to study formal security model of thus protocols.
